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Given that patent law emerged in domestic systems, there was an obvious diversity 
of patent regimes. With the advent of cross-border movement of resources, 
including inventions, there was a need for a harmonized patent regime. The issue 
went to another level with the entry into force of the WTO/TRIPS Agreement, 
which requires WTO members to enact new patent laws or amend existing ones to 
make them TRIPS compliant. The Ethiopian Patent Law, which was enacted in 
1995, is strangely TRIPS compliant, tempting many to think that it had Ethiopia‟s 
forthcoming accession in mind. However, with Ethiopia yet to complete the 
accession process, there are further pressures from industrialized countries to ensure 
that stringent patent rules are complied with in developing countries. This article 
examines TRIPS, the Cotonou Agreement and AGOA as effective instruments of 
ensuring compliance. It is argued that the Ethiopian patent system will continue to 
observe TRIPS and other standards as dictated by the Global North. 
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Although intellectual property (IP) rights existed for so long in some countries, 
it is fairly a new area of property rights, particularly as compared with real 
property rights. IP can be classified into two broad areas: copyright and 
industrial property. These categories cover areas such as copyright and related 
rights, trademark, geographical indications, industrial designs and patents. With 
the development of IP protection pertaining to different areas, there is tension 
between protecting the interests of creators/inventors and public interest. 
Indeed, patent laws have developed fast in the past few decades both at the 
international and national levels. One can notice the development of international 
patent laws and harmonization efforts starting from the 1883 Paris Convention. 
However, the globalization of patent law gained momentum upon the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) is one of the regimes 
under WTO which requires members (including those in the process of 
accession) to enact new laws or amend existing ones, one of the most important 
fields being patent.  
Ethiopia applied for WTO accession in January 2003 and the Working Party 
on the Accession of Ethiopia was established in February 2003.1 The Ethiopian 
Patent Law is largely TRIPS compliant in important aspects which tempts us to 
think that our house is in order, albeit at the cost of citizens. The Ethiopian 
Patent Law is the manifestation of the pressure of globalization than a domestic 
policy objective, and it will further be stretched during the accession process if 
local production capacity (in using certain inventions in Ethiopia) makes 
progress. The experience of other countries shows this trend, particularly in 
view of what it entails on domestic policy decision making. 
Apart from TRIPS, there are also some bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) 
that incorporate provisions on IP. Although numerous in number and diverse in 
nature, this article looks into the impact of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership 
Agreement, also known as the Cotonou Agreement.2 It also explores a 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSPs), in the form of the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which sounds like a non-reciprocal trade benefit 
but a look at its objectives, the eligibility criteria and the experience of the US 
vis-á-vis certain Sub-Saharan African countries tells a different story. This can 
                                           
1
 For Ethiopia‟s accession, see 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_ethiopia_e.htm> accessed 28 September 
2018. 
2
 Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States of the One Part, and the European Community and its Member States of the Other 
Part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (the Cotonou Agreement). 
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be deduced from the emphasis on patent protection in both the Cotonou 
Agreement and AGOA. 
These arrangements in fact have very serious pressures on developing 
countries. Developed countries have successfully designed such BTAs/GSPs to 
exert pressures on developing and least-developed countries (LDCs), in the 
event that there is any policy space left by the TRIPS Agreement. The number 
and nature of BTAs that the US, for instance, had designed and concluded with 
many countries since the aftermath of the Doha Declaration is an example of 
this trend.  
Ethiopia is one of the seventy-eight ACP country members of the Cotonou 
Agreement. It is also one of the eligible countries to the AGOA initiative. It is 
interesting to look at the extent to which the EU and the US are using the 
initiatives to enforce their patent interests on countries like Ethiopia. Indeed, by 
pushing for the inclusion of IP provisions in the Cotonou Agreement and 
AGOA, the two trade powers sent a clear signal that they viewed IP protection 
as an integral component of the „rule of law‟ and „good governance‟, progress 
which was vital to maintaining trade preferences, even in the poorest countries.3 
The main objective of this article is to highlight how the Global North is 
shaping patent laws through trade agreements. This is done by looking into 
TRIPS as the primary tool of harmonization. But with Ethiopia yet to become a 
member of the WTO, it also examines the Cotonou Agreement (a partnership 
agreement) and AGOA (a GSP) based on the experiences of LDC members of 
the WTO as well as the EU/US vis-á-vis member/eligible countries. 
Apart from this short introduction, the article is organized in five sections. 
The first section gives some general background on patent and the major 
theoretical justifications for patent as well as the international efforts of patent 
protection. Section 2 briefly discusses Ethiopia‟s patent law, by focusing on 
some of the pertinent issues with a view to offering a platform for the discussion 
in the coming sections. This is followed by a section that discusses the TRIPS 
Agreement and its impacts on the patent laws of WTO members and countries 
in the accession process. Section 4 explores the potential implications of the 
Cotonou Agreement on the patent laws of members such as Ethiopia. Section 5 
looks into the AGOA initiative. 
                                           
3
 Carolyn Deere (2009), The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global 
Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries, Oxford University Press, 
p. 269. 
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1. Theoretical Justifications and Protection for Patent  
1.1 Patent 
IP, very broadly, means the legal rights which result from intellectual activity in 
the industrial, scientific, literary and artistic fields.4 Generally speaking, IP law 
aims at safeguarding creators and other producers of intellectual goods and 
services by granting them certain rights to control the use made of those 
productions.5 Because of the understanding that these creations of the human 
mind have multifold social and economic impacts, countries have laws on the 
protection of IP. 
IP is divided into two broad areas: copyright and industrial property. A patent 
is the right granted to an inventor to exclude others from commercially 
exploiting the invention for a limited period, in return for the disclosure of the 
invention, so that others may gain the benefit of the invention.6 A patent is 
issued, upon application, by a government office, which describes an invention 
and creates a legal situation in which the patented invention can (normally) only 
be exploited with the authorization of the owner of the patent.7 
In order for a certain invention to be patentable, it has to meet a few criteria. 
These criteria are found both in international agreements and most national 
patent regimes. Accordingly, the invention is required to (i) consist of patentable 
subject matter, (ii) be industrially applicable/useful, (iii) be new/novel, (iv) 
exhibit a sufficient “inventive step” or be non-obvious, and (v) the disclosure of 
the invention in the patent application must meet certain standards (be 
sufficiently clear and set out at least one mode for carrying out the invention).8 
The system is not, however, free from criticisms. One important criticism 
against patent is that it creates a monopoly over the invention, as a result of 
which it is up to the patentee to determine the price at which s/he (it) wants to 
put the invention on the market. Indeed, the temporary monopoly positions 
involve very large (up to 90%) margins on sales where a product is priced 
monopolistically, although the grant of a monopoly right over an invention may 
be regarded as a tradeoff between the state and the inventor.9 
                                           
4
 WIPO, Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use, WIPO Publication No. 489 








 Id., pp. 17-21. 
9
 See Peter J Groves (1997), Sourcebook on Intellectual Property Law, Cavendish 
Publishing, p. 112; Getachew Mengiste (2009), „Impact of the International Patent System 
on Developing Countries‟, Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol. 23. No.1, p. 172. 
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1.2 Theoretical justifications for patents 
There are four major theories that justify patents from different perspectives. 
Proponents of the natural rights theory argue that an inventor has an inherent 
right in the fruits of his/her intellect which include patents.10 Their belief is that 
“patents are the heart and core of property rights, and once they are destroyed, 
the destruction of all other property rights will follow automatically.11 Natural 
rights theory is put to practice in many jurisdictions via the provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Oddi notes that on patentable subject matter, TRIPS 
implements natural rights theory, by providing that all inventions –including 
certain categories of inventions that have been traditionally excluded from 
protection by many countries– are now of such importance to international trade 
that they must be protected universally.12 
According to the incentive theory, patents give the patentee a limited 
monopoly on his invention to recoup his investment in coming up with his 
invention. Although some inventions take years and substantial resources, they 
can easily be copied and put to use, thereby hindering the inventor‟s chance of 
recouping cost of investment. Thus, it is a disincentive to other potential 
inventors if temporary monopoly is not given for their inventions. According to 
the incentive theory, the principal objective of patent systems is to encourage 
innovation, to promote the development of technology and to foster 
dissemination of innovative knowledge to the public.13 
From the perspective of the disclosure theory, the patentee discloses all the 
information pertaining to his/her invention in exchange for having a certain 
invention patented. The theory holds that patents are not necessary to induce 
invention, but rather what patents do is encourage disclosure and, given some 
assumptions about the transaction costs of licensing the invention, it can be used 
more widely than it would be without a patent.14 The idea of this theory, 
therefore, is that a patent constitutes a bargain between the inventor and the 
public, in which the patentee obtains exclusive protection for a set-period of 
time in exchange for giving the public information about the invention.15 Patent 
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 Poku Adusei (2013), Patenting of Pharmaceuticals and Development in Sub-Saharan 




 Id., p. 116. 
13
 Tomoko Miyamoto (2008), „International Treaties and Patent Law Harmonization: Today 
and Beyond‟ in Toshiko Takenaka (ed), Patent Law and Theory: A Handbook of 
Contemporary Research, Edward Elgar, p. 154. 
14
 Roberto Mazzoleni and Richard Nelson (1998), „Economic Theories about the Costs and 
Benefits of Patents‟, Journal of Economic Issues Vol. XXXII No. 4, p. 21. 
15
Adusei, supra note 10, p. 119. 
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laws usually prescribe a certain form through which the disclosure is made, 
which is assumed to facilitate the way the technology will be worked when the 
patent expires and helps promote knowledge and be a catalyst for further 
inventions. 
The public benefit theory argues that by coming up with inventions, the 
inventor is not only benefiting himself through the reward, as the invention by 
and large also benefits the public. This may be in a variety of forms. First, the 
public will benefit from the actual invention itself, such as pharmaceutical 
inventions which treat or cure a disease. Second, the fact that an invention goes 
to a public domain at the expiry of its protection period benefits the public. 
Third, as the inventor provides for a clear description of the invention, the 
public benefits from the knowledge resulting in the invention. 
1.3 National/International Patent Protection 
As with most other areas, the historical development of patent protection clearly 
shows that patent law emerged in domestic systems. One of the earlier patent 
laws emerged in the Republic of Venice in 1474, whose underlying purpose was 
to attract persons with the incentive of a ten-year monopoly right to their „works 
and devices.16 The next significant legislative development in patent law came 
in 1624 with the English Statute of Monopolies.17 Across the Atlantic, although 
one can cite two Patent Laws (the 1790 and 1793) the 1836 Patent Act is 
arguably the first modern patent law in the US.18 Moreover, the 1791 French 
Law on Useful Discoveries and on Means for Securing the Property therein to 
the Authors and the German Patent Act of 1877 are notable developments.19 
Patent laws were divergent among various jurisdictions and this may be 
attributable to two main reasons. First, there is the centuries-old principle of 
territoriality.20 Thus, according to the territoriality principle, IP rights are 
protected only within and in accordance with the legal rules of the jurisdiction 
where they have been granted.21 Second, the diversity is also attributed to the 
acts of government in using patent law as a policy tool for economic growth.22 
Patents protect inventions/technologies which are very important for countries 
irrespective of their level of development.  
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 Graham Dutfield and Uma Suthersanen (2008), Global Intellectual Property Law, Edward 
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Patent laws indeed induce inventions which are important for a country‟s 
development; and it is up to the country concerned to determine whether to have 
a patent law and, if so, the form it should take. However, as the world became 
more and more globalized, there was an increasing movement of economic 
resources beyond one‟s national border.23 The period before the adoption of the 
Paris Convention was characterized by inadequate protection of foreign 
inventions and some countries were not even willing to extend protection to 
foreign inventions.24  
Since the 19thcentury, countries and businesses increasingly recognized the 
value of the IP system as a tool for technological development.25 This naturally 
resulted in moves for the adoption of a few international patent agreements. 
However, it must be noted that as these international agreements need to be 
reinforced by domestic patent laws, the harmonization of patent laws became an 
issue. This is done by either enacting or amending patent laws which, for the 
most part, finds the justification in the territoriality of patent protection 
according to which patents are protected within the jurisdiction where they have 
been granted. 
The Paris Convention could be described as the institutionalization of patent 
system at the international level for the first time and signaled a more global 
concern for the protection of the intangible assets.26 It incorporated three main 
principles: national treatment, priority rights and common rules. Accordingly, 
each member country must provide to nationals of other member countries the 
same protection as it affords to its own nationals (national treatment) and that 
the filing of an application for a patent in one member country gives a right of 
priority to the date of that application in respect of corresponding applications 
filed in other member countries within 12 months of that date (priority right).27 
The Paris Convention (adopted in 1883) has gone through revisions over the 
following century to harmonize procedures relating to, inter alia, priority, 
registration, and licensing.28 
                                           
23
 Id., p. 133. 
24
 Israel Begashaw (2011), „The Ethiopian Patent Regime and Assessment of its 
Compatibility with TRIPS Agreement‟ (LL.M Thesis, Addis Ababa University). 
25
 Chun, supra note 20, p. 133. 
26
 Getachew, supra note 9, p. 178. 
27
 Anne-Marie Mooney Cotter (2003), Intellectual Property Law, (Cavendish Publishing) 
pp. 31-32. See also Miyamoto, supra note 13, pp. 157-158. 
28
 Laurence Helfer (2015), „Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The 
Contested Evolution of the Transnational Legal Order on Access to Medicines‟, Duke 
Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series, No. 2016-18, p. 314. 
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Although the Paris Convention had established fundamental principles and 
some substantive rules, national procedural rules continued to be significantly 
different, while international movement of goods and services expanded 
considerably since the adoption of the Paris Convention.29 The Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT), an agreement for international cooperation, with 
regard to the filing, searching and preliminary examination of patent 
applications and dissemination of technical information contained in patent 
applications, was adopted in 1970 with a view to streamlining the patent 
granting procedures at the global level.30 It entered into force in 1978. Whereas 
the Paris Convention dealt with substantive issues of patent protection, the PCT 
deals with procedures to obtain international patent protection.31 
Although the PCT has greatly simplified the filing of patent applications at 
the international level, substantive patentability requirements varied 
significantly in different jurisdictions.32 The negotiation of harmonization of 
patent law started in 1985 under the auspices of the WIPO. The negotiation 
addressed a number of substantive issues, the harmonization of which was 
considered indispensable for a better international patent system.33 A draft 
„Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention as far as Patents are Concerned‟ 
(draft 1991 Patent Harmonization Treaty) was discussed at the first part of the 
Diplomatic Conference held in The Hague in 1991.34 
2. The Ethiopian Patent Law 
The Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs Proclamation (enacted 
in 1995) governs patent protection in Ethiopia. The Proclamation defines patent 
as a title granted to protect inventions.35 An invention is patentable if it is new,36 
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 Miyamoto, supra note 13, p. 161. 
30
 Ibid. See also Cotter, supra note 27, p. 32; and Getachew, supra note 9, p. 179. 
31
 Randy Campbell (2003), „Global Patent Law Harmonization: Benefits and 
Implementation‟, Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. Vol. 13:2, p. 609. 
32






 Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs Proclamation No. 123/1995, 54
th
 
Year, No. 25 (The Patent Law) Art. 2 (5). An invention is defined as an idea of an 
inventor which permits in practice the solution to a specific problem in the field of 
technology. 
36
 The Law considers an invention as new if it is not anticipated by prior art, which consists 
of everything disclosed to the public, anywhere in the world, by publication in tangible 
form or by oral disclosure, by use or in any other way, prior to the filing date or, where 
appropriate, the priority date, of the application claiming the invention. See the Patent 
Law, Art. 3(3). 
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involves an inventive step37 and is industrially applicable.38 Hence, once a patent 
is granted, a patentee has the exclusive right to make, use or otherwise exploit 
the patented invention, and a third party cannot exploit the patented invention 
without securing the patentee‟s consent.39 
Conversely, the Law excludes the following from patentability: 
- inventions contrary to public order or morality; 
- plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals; 
- schemes, rules or methods for playing games or performing commercial 
and industrial activities and computer programmes; 
- discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; 
- methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or 
therapy, as well as diagnostic methods practiced on the human or animal 
body; 
- works not protected by copyright.40 
The right to a patent belongs to the inventor.41 Where two or more persons 
have jointly made an invention, the patent belongs to them jointly.42 The right to 
a patent for an invention made in the execution of a contract of service or 
employment, unless otherwise agreed, belongs to the person who commissioned 
the work or the employer.43 On the contrary, inventions made without any 
relation to an employment or service contract and without the use of the 
employer‟s resources, data, means, materials or equipment belongs to the 
employee.44 Inventions made by the employer or person commissioned which 
result from both the personal contribution of the author and the resources, data, 
means, materials or equipment of the employer will be owned jointly in equal 
shares.45 
As indicated earlier, the Ethiopian Patent Law protects inventions, whether 
products or processes. Prior to TRIPS, many developing countries used to only 
                                           
37
 An invention involves an inventive step if, having regard to the prior art relevant to the 
application, it would not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. 
See Art. 3(4) of the Patent Law. 
38
 An invention is considered as industrially applicable where it can be made or used in 
handicraft, agriculture, fishery, social services and any other services. 
39
 See the Patent Law, Art. 22. 
40
 Ibid. Art. 4. 
41
 Id., Art. 7 (1). 
42
 Id., Art. 7 (2). 
43
 Id., Art. 7 (3). 
44
 Id., Art. 7 (4). 
45
 Id., Art. 7 (5). 
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protect process patents, and not product patents. If the patent is granted for the 
process, a manufacturer may produce a product through a different process. This 
is important for certain sensitive sectors such as pharmaceuticals. The TRIPS 
Agreement came up with the requirement that patents be available for products 
and processes. But Ethiopia is not a member of the WTO, and the TRIPS 
Agreement is not applicable. It is to be noted that LDCs normally enjoy some 
exceptions during the transition period. 
Prior to TRIPS, countries used to exclude sectors from the protection of 
certain inventions such as pharmaceuticals. Indeed, international conventions 
prior to TRIPS did not specify minimum standards for patents.46 At the time that 
negotiations began, over 40 countries in the world did not grant patent 
protection for pharmaceutical products.47 Under the Ethiopian system, however, 
patent is available in almost all fields of technology, provided that the 
inventions satisfy the requirements provided for therein and subject to the 
exceptions. 
The other area that is substantially influenced by TRIPS is duration of a 
patent. Although the Paris Convention had been silent on the question of patent 
duration, TRIPS demands a minimum period of protection for twenty years.48 In 
Ethiopia, a patent is granted for an initial period of fifteen years, with a 
possibility of extension for five more years if there is proof that the invention is 
being properly worked in the country.49 This is particularly problematic when it 
comes to certain sensitive inventions such as pharmaceutical patents, where the 
patent term coupled with the extension, have huge implications on access to 
medicine. 
Compulsory licensing is another debatable issue in the Ethiopian system. 
Although compulsory license is envisaged under the Patent Law, one may raise 
questions on the grounds for the application and grant of such license. A 
compulsory license may be granted if an invention depends on another patented 
invention or if a patentee fails to work his/her invention in Ethiopia and fails to 
justify his/her inaction within 3 years from the day of grant or 4 years from the 
filing date.50 There is also the requirement of furnishing a proof that prior 
negotiations towards a voluntary license could not be concluded.51 Notably, 
even the TRIPS Agreement has relatively relaxed the grounds for the grant of 
compulsory license than the Ethiopian Patent Law. For instance, the 
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 For the TRIPS Agreement and its impacts on pharmaceuticals and health products, see 




 Deere, supra note 3, p. 66. 
49
 The Patent Law, Art. 16. 
50
 Id., Art. 29 
51
 Id., Art. 31 
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requirements mentioned above may be waived in cases of national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial 
use.52 
The Law further states that a patent shall be invalidated upon the request of 
an interested party if it is proved that the patent is not patentable or the 
description does not disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and 
complete.53 However, one may easily note that Ethiopia‟s patent law does not 
envisage pre-grant patent opposition. Patent systems that require the publication 
of pending patent applications prior to grant and that allow opposition any time 
prior to grant54 are very important. 
One may argue that the Ethiopian Patent Law does not promote local 
interests. A case in point in this respect is the fact that the number of patents 
issued by the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office (EIPO) to Ethiopian 
nationals is so insignificant. This makes it clear that the country relies on 
technologies from abroad. A strong patent system may impair the capacity of 
potential recipients in the developing countries to gain access to essential 
technologies; and that stronger IPs have a considerable negative impact on the 
process of catching up in developing countries by excluding imitation through 
reverse engineering on a wider scale while the cost of obtaining licenses are 
likely to increase, if they are obtainable at all.55 
This evokes a question as to why the Ethiopian Patent Law was designed this 
way. There are arguments that stronger patent protection encourages local 
innovation and facilitates technology transfer. Whether patent protection 
encourages local innovation, facilitates transfer of technology and thereby 
promotes economic development or whether it hurts technological progress and 
economic development by restricting access to knowledge has been the subject 
of discourse for a long time.56 There is no empirical evidence that categorically 
                                           
52
 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 31 (b). 
53
 The Patent Law, Art. 36 (1). 
54
 See Chan Park et al. (2013), Using Law to Accelerate Treatment Access in South Africa: 
An Analysis of Patent, Competition and Medicines Law, United Nations Development 
Programme, pp. 54-55. 
55
 Carlos Correa (2005) „Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to 
Developing Countries?‟ in K Maskus and J Reichman (eds.), International Public Goods 
and Transfer of Public Goods under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime 254;  
Habtamu Hailemeskel (2011), „Designing Intellectual Property Law as a Tool for 
Development: Prospects and Challenges of the Ethiopian Patent Regime‟ (LL.M Thesis, 
Addis Ababa University). 
56
 Fikremarkos Merso (2012), „Ethiopia‟s World Trade Organization Accession and 
Maintaining Policy Space in Intellectual Property Policy in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Era: A Preliminary Look at the Ethiopian 
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makes the point that IP/patent protection promotes science and technology or 
transfer thereof. The channels of acquiring knowledge for LDCs are usually 
imitation of existing technologies, reverse engineering and applying knowledge 
and technologies described in patent papers; and patents may in fact become 
barriers in acquiring technology for such countries.57 
Advocates for strong patent systems argue that such a system would increase 
FDI, and associated technology transfers to developing countries.58 They argue 
that there is a direct link between strong patent protection and an increased 
inflow of FDI citing the increase in certain countries.59 This, however, may not 
work in every country and very much depends on the sector concerned. 
Although patent protection has a significant contribution in attracting FDI, this 
impact depends on some other important social, policy and other factors.  
3. Globalization of Patent Laws through the TRIPS Agreement 
3.1 General 
The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) was adopted in 1967 and entered into force in 1970. The WIPO is 
responsible for promoting IP and administers 23 international treaties on IP 
matters and has a membership of over 180 countries.60 Yet, it is perceived as a 
toothless tiger in the sense that developed countries were „dissatisfied‟ with the 
implementation of the IP rights as WIPO did not have an effective enforcement 
system.61Accordingly, industrialized countries were successful in making sure 
that IP is one of the Agreements of the WTO and that no reservation or 
derogation may be made by its members. 
As noted earlier, one of the issues tabled during the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations, which lasted between 1986 and 1994, was an agreement on IP. 
Along with an Agreement on Services, the negotiation and later the inclusion of 
an Agreement on IP marks a clear departure from the original General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1948, whose application only 
extended to Trade in Goods. As Subhan notes, no other Agreement has been as 
                                                                                                            
Patent Regime in the Light of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Obligations and Flexibilities‟, The Journal of World Intellectual Property 




 UNCTAD (1996), The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries, Geneva, in 
Getachew, supra note 9,  p. 185. 
59
 See Kamil Idris (2002), Intellectual Property: A Power Tool for Economic Growth, 
Geneva, in Getachew supra note 9, p. 185. 
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much of a driving force behind the globalization and liberalization of trade 
barriers as the set of these agreements that comprise the WTO.62 
Hence, while the pre-TRIPS global IP system provided „a menu of treaties‟ 
from which countries could „pick and choose and in some cases make 
reservations to‟, TRIPS obliges all WTO members to implement minimum 
standards of protection within specified deadlines for virtually all categories of 
IP including patents.63 TRIPS puts new and unparalleled emphasis on making 
privately held IP rights enforceable, demanding stronger provisions in national 
IP laws to promote enforcement of IP rights at the border and within the 
domestic market.64 
The inclusion of IP rights as one of the single undertakings of the WTO 
package has since received criticisms from different fronts. Some writers hold 
that the TRIPS Agreement was unnecessary as most of its functions have, for up 
to a century, been addressed by conventions such as the Paris Convention, Rome 
Convention, and the UN-based WIPO.65 However, a critical look at how things 
evolved clearly reveals that an international patent regime with stronger 
enforcement was inevitable. The adoption of the PCT and the 1985 WIPO 
Harmonization Discussions are evidence of how developed countries were 
persistent in having certain forms of international patent regimes with strong 
enforcement mechanisms.66 
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 Junaid Subhan (2006), „Scrutinized: The TRIPS Agreement and Public Health‟, McGill 
Journal of Medicine 9(2) p. 153. 
63
 Deere, supra note 3, p. 10. The TRIPS Agreement, inter alia, aims to:  
   (a) harmonize IP rights protection by providing for the minimum standards that should be 
adopted by member states;  
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As one of the protected fields, patents should be available for any invention, 
whether product or process in all fields of technology.67 Two major issues have, 
thus, been introduced by the TRIPS. First, in the pre-TRIPS era, developing 
countries were only giving process patents and not product patents. Second, 
while many countries did not recognize certain areas as patentable subject-
matters, under the TRIPS all inventions are patentable irrespective of their field 
of technology. 
For the most part, developed countries already had TRIPS standards and IP 
institutions in place and needed to make only minor revisions to domestic IP 
laws and administration to implement TRIPS.68 For developing countries, on the 
other hand, implementation of TRIPS requires them to raise their IP standards 
(increasing the terms and scope of protection).69 For most countries, this 
involves a complex set of reforms to update or redraft existing laws, adopt new 
laws, and/or promulgate new administrative regulations and guidelines.70 
Needless to say, the fact that WTO Members are required to bring their 
domestic patent laws in compliance with the minimum TRIPS standards is a 
clear instance that shows the impacts of the globalization of patent law. 
Developed countries were given a one year period to be fully TRIPS compliant, 
while developing countries were given 5 years to have their patent laws conform 
to the TRIPS.71 LDC members of the WTO were initially given 11 years which 
has now been extended to 2021. Hence, save these LDC members of the 
WTO,72 the other members of the WTO have made their domestic patent laws 
compatible with the TRIPS. This implies that such moves are contributing 
                                                                                                            
enact IP reforms that benefitted foreign industries, including US based pharmaceutical 
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towards a harmonized patent law when it comes to certain important aspects 
such as patentable subject matter and term of protection. 
3.2 TRIPS and the Ethiopian patent law 
Ethiopia is currently in the accession process to join the WTO. The WTO 
Agreement73 envisages two kinds of membership: original membership and 
membership through accession. Countries that were the Contracting Parties of 
the GATT are referred to as the original members of the WTO.74 At the end of 
1994, GATT had 123 members, which accordingly became original members of 
the WTO. Accession is the other way through which membership of the WTO is 
acquired.75 Over two dozen countries have become members of the WTO, after 
having completed the rigorous accession process which, in most cases, takes 
several years. 
For Ethiopia to become a member of the WTO, it has to go through the 
scrupulous accession process of the WTO. A country (or a separate customs 
territory) may become WTO observer before making an application to the 
WTO. Accordingly, Ethiopia became an observer in 1997 and made a 
declaration of intent to apply for accession.76 It later submitted its application in 
January 2003, and a Working Party was established in February of that year and 
the negotiations are still underway.77 
The accession process is carried out on two parallel and often overlapping 
tracks. The first track is multilateral that aims to find out the relevant laws, 
policies and practices of the acceding country and ensure that they are brought 
into conformity with WTO rules, and the second track is a bilateral track that 
aims to extract as many specific commitments from the acceding country.78 The 
one that is of immediate importance here is the multilateral track. It starts with 
the applicant country‟s submission of a Memorandum on its Foreign Trade 
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Regime (MFTR), a crucial document that is prepared in accordance with the 
detailed outline format provided by the WTO Secretariat.79 Once the MFTR is 
submitted, members of the Working Party start the questions and answers 
process in which they try to learn about the applicant country‟s trade and legal 
regime and identify areas of possible inconsistency with WTO Agreements.80 
This multilateral process then moves on to negotiate “the terms of accession”, 
which covers WTO rules on goods and TRIPS as well.81 
The Working Party enquires into a country‟s trade and legal regimes with a 
view to identifying areas of inconsistency with WTO Agreements, and the 
TRIPS is one of such Agreements that have particular importance. With limited 
exceptions pertaining to the status of the applying country, a country that has 
applied for membership has to „bring its house in order‟ and ensure that its IP 
related trade and legal regime is compatible with TRIPS. 
As stated above, patent is one of the areas of protection under the TRIPS 
Agreement. Thus, notwithstanding the special and differential treatment and 
certain flexibilities that Ethiopia as an LDC is entitled to, its patent regime has 
to be consistent with TRIPS. There is an argument which is associated with the 
time when the Patent Law was enacted, which coincides with the entry into 
force of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. Fikremarkos opines 
that the Patent Proclamation might have been informed by the TRIPS 
Agreement with the possible understanding on the part of the drafters that 
sooner or later the country would start the accession process and ensuring 
TRIPS compatibility of the Patent Proclamation was a forward looking 
approach.82 
The experience of certain countries which had acceded to the WTO indeed 
substantiates the argument that making national patent laws compatible with 
TRIPS is a prerequisite. Assessing China‟s accession, Maskus notes that 
external pressure has been an important impetus for legal change in the country, 
which culminated with the introduction of numerous changes in China‟s IPRs 
regime in anticipation of joining the WTO.83 There are also other examples in 
the same vein. Cambodia, for example, submitted its Memorandum on the 
Foreign Trade Regime (MFTR) in 1999, enacted a new Patent Law in January 
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2003 and was admitted to WTO in September of the same year. Saudi Arabia 
promulgated, inter alia, a new Patent Law in 2004 during the course of the 
accession process and became a member by the end of 2005. As noted earlier, 
the trend is also the same when one looks into the experience of original 
members of the WTO, particularly developing and least-developed ones, 
whereby they had to enact a new patent law or amend existing ones to ensure 
conformity with the TRIPS Agreement. 
As noted, LDC members of the WTO are entitled to certain transitional 
arrangements in respect of the TRIPS Agreement. It may be argued that, even if 
the Patent Law is TRIPS compliant, Ethiopia may not (upon completion of the 
accession process) be obliged, as an LDC, to fully implement the TRIPS 
Agreement during the transitional period embodied under WTO rules. However, 
this may not work equally for original members of the WTO and those which 
became members through accession.84 This is because the obligations of 
acceding members are determined by their terms of accession and these 
countries may not necessarily be entitled to the rights accorded to existing LDC 
members.85 What the accession experience of Cambodia and Nepal suggests is 
that acceding countries may not necessarily be entitled to the rights of the LDCs, 
and WTO members and their fate is determined more by the terms of accession 
than the WTO rules.86 
One may, therefore, argue that the Ethiopian Patent Law had its focus on 
WTO membership. And in order to do that, it was clear that one of the 
requirements was to make the Patent Law TRIPS compatible, because the 
TRIPS is one of the Agreements in the WTO single undertakings package. It can 
further be argued that there was no way for the drafters of the Ethiopian Patent 
Law to foresee the transitional arrangements and the flexibilities that were made 
available for countries like Ethiopia, even if special and differential treatment of 
LDCs is not something new introduced by the TRIPS Agreement and 
subsequent WTO Decisions. That said, there seems to be no argument that going 
for a strong a patent law was not the right thing to do. After 25 years since 
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Ethiopia‟s request to join the WTO, its concessions in the IP regime have been 
futile, and the accession process appears to have stalled. 
4. Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Globalization of 
Patents: The Cotonou Agreement and Ethiopian Patent Law 
4.1 Bilateral Trade Agreements and Patents 
The world today is witnessing the proliferation of BTAs, whose underlying 
motivations are diverse. There are two broad categories of BTAs: the first are 
regional or country-specific BTAs and the second fall under subject-specific 
bilateral trade and cooperation agreements.87 There are a few agreements in the 
first category such as trade and investment framework agreements. They are 
initial agreements concerned with laying down the foundations for negotiations 
of a bilateral free-trade or investment agreement between two countries.88 There 
are also FTAs which deal with extensive issues like investment, where bilateral 
investment treaties establish the terms and conditions for private investment by 
nationals and companies of one state in another state.89 Bilateral cooperation, 
partnership and association agreements deal with market reforms, investment 
and IP protection.90 Under the second category, i.e. subject-specific bilateral 
treaties and agreements, we find bilateral science and research and development 
cooperation agreements and bilateral IP agreements.91 
BTAs of various kinds have grown in number and membership. One of the 
interesting characteristics of most BTAs is that they do not make room for 
reservations to be made in respect of the provisions incorporated in the 
agreements. Accordingly, as with other issues, a country willing to be part of 
such agreements accepts every provision in a given agreement, including certain 
purely non-trade matters such as political aspects, poverty reduction, fight 
against terrorism, combating corruption, the provisions on human rights 
including IP protection. As will be seen later, the provisions on IP protection in 
most cases make reference to multilateral IP agreements and clearly provide that 
patent is among the IP rights to be protected. 
One may notice the proliferation of BTAs since the turn of the century. This 
is particularly true since the adoption of the Doha Declaration.92 The adoption of 
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this Declaration and, subsequently, of a decision aimed at facilitating the 
importation of medicines by developing countries without manufacturing 
capacity in pharmaceuticals, was an attempt to ensure, through the effective use 
of the permitted flexibilities; and this shows some balance in the implementation 
of the TRIPS Agreement and, in particular, it indicates that public health should 
be given priority in case of conflict with IP rules.93  
Most developed countries, which were frustrated at the manner in which the 
TRIPS flexibilities were interpreted at Doha, turned to BTAs to get back what 
they believed to have lost at Doha by imposing stricter IP rules in these 
agreements.94 The wave of BTAs, particularly those by the US and EU with 
developing countries,95 represents a drastic setback in this respect, since they not 
only erode flexibilities but impose a number of additional obligations on states 
that can further restrict their endeavor in promoting access to medicine.96 
These BTAs include a chapter on IP, and they further impose restrictions in 
the criteria of patentability, patent territory, patent duration and disclosure of 
clinical data, which restrict the flexibility otherwise provided by the TRIPS 
Agreement.97 The ones promoted by the US oblige partner signatory countries to 
extend the patent term to compensate for „unreasonable‟ delays „beyond‟ a 
certain period (a) in the procedures for the marketing approval of a medicine 
and (b) in the examination of patent applications.98 A very good example is the 
US-CAFTA Agreement (US-Central America Free Trade Agreement, which 
provides that “each party shall make available a restoration of the patent term to 
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compensate the patent owner for unreasonable curtailment of the effective 
patent term as a result of marketing approval process”.99 
4.2 The Cotonou Agreement and its influence on Ethiopian patent law 
With the decolonization process gaining ground in the early 1960s, the 
hegemony came back through the backdoor, this time with a trade cooperation 
tag. This culminated in the signing of the Yaoundé Convention in 1963. In 1975, 
forty-six African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States, largely made up of 
former colonies of European states, entered into an agreement to formally 
establish the ACP Group of States in order to consolidate and strengthen 
existing solidarity among them and promote understanding between ACP 
peoples and governments.100 In 2000, representatives from the EU and seventy-
seven ACP countries met in Cotonou, Benin to sign a trade and aid accord to 
replace the Lomé IV Convention, which had expired earlier that year, and to set 
the seal on a quarter of a century of cooperation between a number of partners 
from North and South.101 
In the 2000s, the European Commission explicitly included a TRIPS-plus 
mandate in its trade goals, stating that “the EU should seek to strengthen IPR 
provisions in future bilateral agreements and the enforcement of existing 
commitments”.102 Initial public statements by the EU suggested that IP would 
not play a significant part in EPAs (European Partnership Agreements) and 
consistently noted that the EU does not need market access to the ACP 
Countries and that the goal of the Agreement is the development of the ACP 
Countries.103 However, recent proposals, papers and statements from the EU, 
including the new EU Trade Policy review paper suggest that the Agreements 
are a crucial element of the EU‟s global trade strategy and that, in particular, the 
EU is seeking higher IP standards, which includes patents.104 
Indeed, while the Cotonou Agreement notes the need to take into account 
different levels of development, it has several TRIPS-plus aspects, including 
recognition of the need to accede to all relevant international conventions on IP 
for patent protection of biotechnological inventions, and for the legal protection 
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of non-original databases (also not required by TRIPS).105 This goes beyond 
TRIPS which does not call on countries to accede to any additional international 
IP conventions. It is, therefore, clear that the EU has a long history of including 
IP in its bilateral agreements, and that the majority of the negotiated EU BTAs 
reflect undertakings to adopt higher standards of IP protection, i.e. “to provide,” 
or “to ensure,” “suitable and effective” or “adequate and effective levels of 
protection of IP rights in accordance with the highest international standards”.106 
There are also a number of EU official documents which suggest that 
agreements, which have become part of the EU trade strategy such as the 
Cotonou Agreement are important tools to enforce EU IP/patent interests. The 
“Global Europe –Competing in the World” Report emphasizes on the 
importance of market access and IP as tools for greater European 
advancement.107 Part iii of Section 3.2 of the Report deals with “Opening 
Markets Abroad” and states that the EU “will require a sharper focus on market 
opening and stronger rules in new trade areas of economic importance, notably 
IP.108 According to Part ii of Section 4.2 relating to „Free Trade Agreements‟, 
“FTAs should include stronger provisions for IPR and competition, including, 
for example, provisions on enforcement of IP rights along the lines of the EC 
Enforcement Directive”.109 Part v of the same Section also states that “the EU 
should seek to strengthen IP provisions in future bilateral agreements and the 
enforcement of existing commitments in order to reduce IPR violations…”110 
The Cotonou Agreement provides that the Parties to the Agreement 
recognize the need to ensure an adequate and effective level of protection of 
intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights, and other rights covered 
by TRIPS in line with the international standards with a view to reducing 
distortions and impediments to bilateral trade.111 This provision clearly 
represents a BTA attempting to enforce the TRIPS Agreement on countries such 
as Ethiopia that are not WTO members, even if the provision is framed in such a 
way that it acknowledges the importance of TRIPS compliant IP regime in the 
ACP Countries for reducing distortions and impediments to bilateral trade.  
Also interesting is that Parties to the Cotonou Agreement underline the 
importance of adherence to the TRIPS Agreement and have agreed on the need 
to accede to all relevant international conventions on intellectual, industrial and 
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commercial property under Part I of the TRIPS Agreement, in line with their 
level of development.112 Although the provisions employ soft words such as 
„…underline the importance…‟ and „…agree on the need to accede to…‟, they 
still target at accession to TRIPS and the adherence of ACP countries to 
international agreements, even if such adherence were to compromise their 
domestic policy objectives. 
Ethiopia was one of the Parties to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement 
signed in Cotonou in 2001 and ratified the Agreement through Proclamation No. 
242/2001. According to the Proclamation, the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Cooperation was empowered to implement the Cotonou 
Agreement.113 There was no mention of other government organs under 
Proclamation No. 242/2001, with which the Ministry of Economic Development 
and Cooperation was to collaborate in implementing the Agreement. However, 
under Proclamation No. 524/2007 which ratified the amending Agreement, the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) was authorized to 
implement the Cotonou Agreement in collaboration with appropriate 
government organs.114 This provision is repeated verbatim in the Proclamation 
which ratified the further amendment to the Cotonou Agreement.115 
As the Cotonou Agreement incorporates provisions on IP, one of the 
Government organs that MoFED is expected to collaborate with in implementing 
the Cotonou Agreement is the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office (EIPO), 
which is established pursuant to Proclamation No. 320/2003. One of the 
objectives of the Office is to facilitate the provision of adequate legal protection 
for and exploitation of IP in the country, which includes patent.116 This is also 
clear from the reading of Article 16 of the Proclamation whereby the Office 
assumed rights and obligations of the Ethiopian Science and Technology 
Commission concerning patents and related matters under Proclamation No. 
7/1995 as well as the Patent Proclamation. Furthermore, one of the duties of the 
Office is to implement and/or follow up the implementation of international IP 
agreements to which Ethiopia is a party.117 MoFED is, therefore, expected to 
collaborate with EIPO in implementing IP related provisions of the Cotonou 
Agreement. 
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One may ask what the Cotonou Agreement brings to the Ethiopian Patent 
system, as it already is largely TRIPS compliant. For one thing, Ethiopia is not 
yet a member of the Paris Convention. As a Party to the Cotonou Agreement, 
Ethiopia has undertaken to accede to all international conventions on IP, 
including the Paris Convention. Moreover, the Parties have agreed to strengthen 
their cooperation with regard to IP, which, inter alia, extends to the preparation 
of laws and regulations for the protection and enforcement of IP rights, the 
prevention of the abuse of such rights by right holders and the infringement of 
such rights by competitors, the establishment and reinforcement of domestic and 
regional offices and other agencies including support for regional IP 
organizations involved in enforcement and protection, including the training of 
personnel.118 In view of current realities, the term „cooperation‟ apparently 
means European influence in the ACP Countries in the abovementioned areas 
and certainly, it is not a two way relationship between the EU and the ACP 
Countries. 
5. The Generalized System of Preferences and the Globalization 
of Patents: AGOA and the Ethiopian Patent Law 
5.1 The Generalized System of Preferences 
Preferential treatment of trade was considered as one of the most trade distorting 
manifestations of the pre-GATT period. In response to this challenge, the Most-
Favored Nations Treatment Principle (MFN) appears in the very first Article of 
GATT 1948. According to the principle, GATT members treat every contracting 
party as the most favored, and as a consequence, a favor granted to a party will 
also be made available for all the trading partners. It is not surprising that the 
principle forms the cornerstone of the other Agreements in the WTO package. 
The MFN Principle has a few exceptions, and the GSP is one of these 
exceptions which grants unilateral arrangements to developing countries and 
LDCs to export their products for a reduced [or no] tariff. A few practical issues 
were not clear for some time. However, the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979 
brought up clarification on such arrangements, when developing countries 
secured adoption of the Enabling Clause, a permanent deviation from MFN by 
joint decision of the GATT Contracting Parties.119 The Clause states that 
notwithstanding GATT Article I, “Contracting Parties may accord differential 
and more favorable treatment to developing countries, without according such 
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treatment to other Contracting Parties” and this exception applies to (1) 
preferential tariff Trade Preferences for Developing Countries; (2) multilateral 
nontariff preferences negotiated under GATT auspices; (3) multilateral 
arrangements among less developed countries; and (4) special treatment of 
LDCs in the context of any general or specific measures in favor of developing 
countries.120 
The US has been administering GSPs with many countries. According to the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, US trade preferences such as 
the GSP is the largest and oldest US trade preference program that provides 
opportunities for many of the world‟s poorest countries to use trade in pursuits 
of economic growth and to climb out of poverty.121 The US currently administers 
and has obtained waivers for the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
(CBERA), the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATP), and the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which extend duty-free treatment and waiver of 
other conditions such as non-discrimination in administering quotas.122 
5.2 AGOA and US influence on Sub-Saharan African countries 
Irrespective of the reasons provided in an attempt to justify conditionalities 
attached to aid or loan, it has been a while since they have become a global 
phenomenon. The IMF has been one of the international institutions which have 
pursued this trend. In exchange for financial support, borrowing countries agree 
to implement a package of obligatory policy reforms (conditionality), phased 
over one or more years, and its implementation is assessed on a regular basis.123 
Apart from the international financial institutions, trade benefit initiatives 
such as AGOA have also been attracting attention as conditionalities continue to 
be attached, some of which have nothing to do with trade. AGOA is one of the 
examples in this category. It was signed into law by President Clinton in 2000 
with the objective of expanding US trade and investment with sub-Saharan 
Africa, to stimulate economic growth, to encourage economic integration, and to 
facilitate sub-Saharan Africa‟s integration into the global economy.124 The US 
Congress requires the President to determine annually the sub-Saharan African 
countries that are eligible for AGOA benefits based on certain criteria, including 
progress towards the establishment of a market-based economy, rule of law, 
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economic policies to reduce poverty, protection of internationally recognized 
worker rights, and efforts to combat corruption.125 Hence, if the President for 
whatever reason holds that a country is “engaged in activities that undermine US 
national security or foreign policy interests” or “engaged in gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights or provided support for acts of 
international terrorism and cooperated in international efforts to eliminate 
human rights violations and terrorist activities”,126 the country will not be 
eligible for the opportunity. 
GSP dictates are purely unilateral in nature in the sense that the country 
which grants it to another may withdraw it anytime. Yet, AGOA goes a step 
further as the eligibility of sub-Saharan countries is put under the mercy of an 
incumbent US President. One may also presume the influence of the big US 
corporations behind selecting the African countries eligible for the opportunity. 
Mushita, for example, asks if it is African countries or American companies that 
really benefit from the arrangement.127 
The determinative eligibility criteria of AGOA demand that a country “has 
established, or is making continual progress toward establishing,” inter alia: 
a) a market-based economy that protects private property rights; 
b) the rule of law, political pluralism, and the right to due process, a fair 
trial, and equal protection under the law; 
c) the elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment; 
d) economic policies to reduce poverty, increase the availability of health 
care and educational opportunities; 
e) a system to combat corruption and bribery [and]; 
f) protection of internationally recognized worker rights, including the right 
of association, [and] the right to organize and bargain collectively.128 
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It is easy to see that most of these eligibility requirements have nothing to do 
with trade issues, particularly when weighed against the objectives of AGOA 
itself. Moreover, inserting a clause on the “elimination of barriers to US trade 
and investment” is bizarre and reinforces the argument that AGOA in fact 
appears in the interest of the US, and not solely in the interests of African 
countries. It also conveniently refutes the claim that AGOA is non-reciprocal. 
Although eligible countries do and will continue to benefit from AGOA, the 
claim that the US is benefiting from the initiative in pursuing its trade and 
political objectives (in the countries it selects as eligible) is palatable.  
5.3 AGOA and its impact on Ethiopia 
In the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Congress clearly linked trade and IP, where 
IP was a „new‟ trade issue, along with services.129 The Trade Act made IP 
infringement a subject of the National Trade Estimates Report on Foreign Trade 
Barriers, a cause of action under Section 301, and a consideration in the 
designation of countries for inclusion in the GSP.130 The US held bilateral 
discussions with many countries to improve their IP regimes and enforcement 
by, inter alia, using the GSP review process.131 
The provision of immediate importance is found under Article 104(c) of 
AGOA where it is required to afford protection to IP rights to US investors. As 
effective IP protection and enforcement mechanism is one of the criteria for 
determining eligibility of sub-Saharan African Countries in AGOA, it remains 
one of the tools for the US Government (as well as companies) to impose their 
interests.132 The International Intellectual Property Alliance, for example, noted 
that the US Government‟s AGOA review is one of the few regularly occurring 
opportunities to examine IP protection and enforcement in AGOA-eligible 
countries and to provide guidance to make those mechanisms more effective.133 
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The above discussion shows how AGOA has become a very effective 
instrument to enforce US IP interests in African countries. For instance, South 
Africa is one of the sub-Saharan African countries that have relatively optimal 
benefits from the AGOA initiative. In 2013, there was an effort to revise the 
South African IP Policy, which was motivated by the need to promote access to 
medicines particularly for people living with HIV. Two years later, the 
American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa (which represents 250 
companies operating in South Africa, including several multinational 
pharmaceutical firms) urged the US Trade Representative to use its review of 
AGOA to pressure South Africa‟s Government to revise the draft policy in favor 
of US Companies, which many civil societies vehemently opposed and rallied 
against.134 This clearly shows how US companies who have interests in Africa 
put pressure on the US Government to make effective use of AGOA to serve 
their interests, essentially by exerting pressures against the domestic policy 
space of the eligible countries. 
Insofar as the objectives of arrangements is to establish commitments for 
countries to significantly strengthen their domestic enforcement procedures 
through different mechanisms,135 patent protection in Ethiopia cannot be free 
from the interests of foreign-based companies. As indicated earlier, failing to 
protect patent may be a cause for disqualification from AGOA, an initiative 
which, if Ethiopia were to benefit from it, considerably increases the value of 
exports eligible for preferential market access to the US.136 The experience of 
other countries under the AGOA initiative also reinforces this argument. 
Concluding Remarks 
This article has attempted to examine the impact of globalization on patent laws 
of developing countries. As the experience of developing countries indicates, 
developed countries continue to use various international agreements to enforce 
their interests. The TRIPS Agreement is a prime suspect in this regard, as it 
requires developing countries to enact new patent laws or amend existing ones 
and give patent protection for products and processes in any field of technology. 
Following certain flexibilities and transitional arrangements (granted to certain 
developing and LDCs as the result of the Doha Declaration), developed 
countries started to negotiate and enter into different sorts of BTAs with a view 
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to reclaiming what they thought they would lose as a result of the Doha 
Declaration or any other development in the field. Moreover, BTAs and the 
benefits that they entail appear non-reciprocal. The important place accorded to 
IP/patent protection in both the Cotonou Agreement and AGOA makes it clear 
that the initiatives are in fact important tools to ensure that IP interests of 
foreign-based companies are enforced.  
As discussed earlier, Ethiopia has a strong and a TRIPS compliant Patent 
Law. In light of the experience of some developing countries, Ethiopia may 
further be forced to give up its entitlements at the business end of the accession 
process. Cambodia, for example, had been a subject of TRIPS-plus measures, as 
it was forced to ratify the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants Convention and adhere to the entire TRIPS Agreement by 
January 2007 (as opposed to 2021) including pharmaceutical patents (as 
opposed to 2033). 
All these experiences lead to one direction. With the growth in the Ethiopian 
domestic production capacity of some inventions, it is to be expected that the 
trade agreements may be used to put pressure on Ethiopia to maintain the 
existing patent regime. The pharmaceutical industry offers a good example in 
this regard. There is said to be a glimmer of hope in Ethiopia when it comes to 
medicines, as the pharmaceutical sector is expected to make progress in the 
coming years. For example, there is the 10 years Strategy and Plan of Action for 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Development.137 To this end, the pharmaceutical 
industry zone (that the Government is planning to make available for 
pharmaceutical producers) is being built in the outskirts of Addis Ababa. If 
these and other initiatives succeed, the pharmaceutical industry can produce 
important generic medicines, and this will certainly induce pressures to force 
Ethiopia to come up with stricter patent protection and enforcement measures by 
using the arrangements discussed above. 
 Ethiopia has already surrendered too much by opting for a strong Patent Law 
and should not surrender anymore as it would result in unprecedented shrinking 
of its domestic policy space for the sake of getting (if at all) some trade benefits 
out of WTO membership. The same holds true in negotiating and concluding 
BTAs of any kind, as, needless to say, public interest prevails over any trade 
interest.                                                                                                                 ■ 
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